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II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Statement of the Case
This case involves the question of whether a court may consider extrinsic evidence when
a promissory note and deed of trust are latently ambiguous. Because the instruments at issue in
this case included a principal amount more than double the purchase price for the subject
property, the trial court found that there was a latent ambiguity, and subsequently used parol
evidence to determine the real intent of the parties. Defendant-Respondent Mark Porcello
(“Mark”) hereby asserts that the trial court properly ascertained the intent of the parties with
extrinsic evidence and the trial court’s findings should be upheld.
B. Procedural History
In June 2016, Tony Porcello (“Tony”) and Annie Porcello (“Annie”) commenced nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings against a house located at 1663 E. Northwood Drive, Hayden,
Idaho (the “Hayden home”). R. 26, 30-31. At that time, Jennifer Porcello (“Jennifer”) resided in
the home with her five daughters. Jennifer commenced this action on October 5, 2016, against
Tony and Annie, seeking a preliminary injunction to stop the Trustee’s Sale. R. 23. Jennifer
claimed that the Hayden home belonged to her “free and clear.” R. 28, 30. Tony and Annie filed
a counterclaim against Jennifer and a third-party complaint against Mark—claiming Mark and
Jennifer “failed to pay the interest payments as required” by the Note and Deed of Trust, and that
the Note “is past due and owing in the full amount of $648,500 plus interest.” R. 154.
The parties stipulated to the filing of an amended counterclaim substituting Kalyn
Porcello (“Kalyn”) as personal representative of the Estate of Annie Porcello for Annie Porcello,
individually. The case was heard before the Kootenai County District Court. R. 453-54. The
District Court granted Mark’s request for a dismissal and found that Jennifer’s obligation under
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the Note and Deed of Trust on the Hayden home was satisfied when the Legacy Group Capital
loan was paid in full, and the proceeds from the sale of the Woodinville home disbursed. R. 478.
Appellants Estate of Anthony J. Porcello and Annie C. Porcello and Kalyn M. Porcello
filed an appeal to this Court, claiming the District Court erred. Appellants’ Brief, at 1.
C. Statement of Facts
Mark and his late mother, Annie, were business partners. Tr. 98:7-99:7; 112:1-6 (Mark).
The two of them would do real estate deals, wherein Annie would finance the purchase of real
estate, Mark would do work on the property and pay for improvements, then the profits would be
split. Tr. 1490:1-6 (Kalyn); Tr. 94:17-95:4 (Mark). Mark’s father was a party to the transactions,
but he did not keep up to speed on the details. Tr. 98:12-99:2 (Mark).
In 2011, Mark found a house in Woodinville, Washington to buy, remodel and flip.
Consistent with past practice, Annie agreed to get a loan for the house and Mark agreed to pay
all the costs of the house while he lived in it and remodeled it. Tr. 115:1-116:9;113:5-19; 109:712 (Mark). It was understood that when the house was sold, Mark and his mother would split the
profits. Tr. 1490:1-6 (Mark);Tr. 1428:7-12 (Kalyn).
The house was purchased for $401,000 on January 4, 2012. R. 25, 65. Mark paid the
earnest money of $6,000 for the house. R. 110:2-8 (Mark). The remaining down payment for the
house was $93,394.43. R. 68. Mark transferred approximately $40,000 to Annie for the down
payment; Mark’s parents, Tony and Annie, paid the rest of the down payment using their funds.
Tr. 111:1-112:11 (Mark). Mark’s parents also got a loan for $300,000 from Wells Fargo for the
balance of the purchase price. Tr. 113:5-13; 157:9-20 (Mark).
As Mark and Annie agreed, while Mark’s parents owned the house, Mark made all the
payments to Wells Fargo, paid the property taxes, and put his own money into remodeling. Tr.
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115:1-116:9;113:5-19 (Mark). In 2012-2014, Mark and Jennifer’s marriage was rocky and they
split up. Tr. 122 (Mark). Jennifer claimed she owned an equitable interest in the Woodinville
house. Tr. 122:16-123:12 (Mark). After arbitration, Jennifer was evicted from the house because
Annie and Mark proved Jennifer did not have any equitable interest in the Woodinville house.
Tr. 125:5-7 (Mark); R. 56-57.
Mark and Jennifer later reconciled and remarried on Thanksgiving of 2013. Tr. 126:1-8
(Mark). In 2014, Mark and Jennifer decided to purchase the house in Hayden. Tr. 126:15-127:2
(Mark). Mark made earnest money deposits on the Hayden home, but did not have time to get
conventional financing. Tr. 130:5-18; 132:20-133:24; 160:15-19; 166:15-22 (Mark). Mark
worked with Legacy Group Capital, LLC (“Legacy”), who agreed to finance the purchase by
refinancing the Woodinville house to pay off the Wells Fargo loan, and loaning Mark’s parents
enough money to finance the purchase of the Hayden home. Tr. 134:14-19; 135:11-14 (Mark).
The Legacy loan would allow Mark and Jennifer to purchase the Hayden home before the
Woodinville property sold. Tr. 159:14-161:4; 161:11-25 (Mark).
The Final Settlement Statement shows Legacy loaned Mark’s parents $648,500,
distributed as follows:
● $17,315.50 for settlement charges
● $270,452.56 to Wells Fargo to pay off the first position lien
● $312,033.32 to purchase the Hayden home
● $48,677.62 to Mark’s parents
R. 37. Legacy’s collateral was the Woodinville house and a property in Indian Wells, California,
owned by Annie, as her separate property, for the benefit of Mark. Mark and Jennifer purchased
the Hayden home for $361,253.27 after fees. R. 41.
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Joe Mijich, the lawyer for Mark’s parents, prepared a promissory note and deed of trust
to secure the loan from Mark’s parents to Jennifer and Mark for the purchase of the Hayden
home. Tr. 906:16-23 (Tony). The promissory note had a principal balance of $648,500, which
exactly matched the new loan from Legacy. Tr. 168:7-16 (Mark); Tr. 974:22-25 (Kim). The loan
to Jennifer and Mark to purchase the Hayden home was only $312,044.32. Tr. 168:17-23 (Mark).
Jennifer and Mark questioned why the note was for $648,500 before signing. Tr. 168:2425 (Mark). Jennifer believed the loan should have been about $312,000 because that was the
amount needed to complete the sale, and she refused to sign the promissory note. Tr. 169:20170:7 (Mark). Mark and Jennifer called Joe Mijich, who explained that the promissory note was
identical to the Legacy loan. Tr. 170:12-13; 171:17-174:23; 258:1-6 (Mark). Joe Mijich
explained that the Legacy loan would be paid off when the Woodinville house sold. Tr. 174:1315 (Mark). The due date on the promissory note was November 29, 2014, because Mark believed
the Woodinville house would sell before then. Tr. 430:1-3 (Mark); R. 44. When the Woodinville
house sold, the debt to Legacy Group Capital would be paid in full. Tr. 174:13-15 (Mark). Once
Legacy was paid, the promissory note for the Hayden home would be deemed paid. Tr. 267:5-13
(Mark).
Problems arose when the Woodinville house did not sell quickly because the Legacy loan
was short-term. Tr. 184:6-12. Mark secured a loan for $480,000 from Evergreen Moneysource
Mortgage Company (“Evergreen”) to get a loan to pay Legacy back (“Evergreen loan”). Tr.
185:3-7, 20. The Evergreen loan paid most of the Legacy loan, but Legacy was still owed about
$198,000. Tr. 189:5-7.
Mark also had a lease with an option to purchase on a house in Bellevue, Washington. Tr.
746:24-747:9 (Jennifer). Mark needed to exercise that option to purchase in July of 2015. Tr.
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131:15-18 (Mark). To complete the purchase in Bellevue, Mark obtained a loan from Evergreen
for $417,000. Tr. 414:14-20 (Mark). Mark’s parents would borrow the $417,000 and the loan
would be secured by Indian Wells, CA property owned by Annie for the benefit of Mark. Tr.
414:14-20 (Mark).
On July 31, 2015, the Woodinville house sold for $690,000 and the sale proceeds were
distributed to Mark so that he could pay off the Legacy loan. Tr. 212:17-18 (Mark). When the
Legacy loan was paid off, the promissory note was paid and the deed of trust on the Hayden
home should have been reconveyed. Tr. 250:11-17; 252:1-22 (Mark).
The outstanding Evergreen loan for $417,000 refinanced the entire debt owed under the
promissory note secured by the deed of trust on the Hayden home. Tr. 250:7-17 (Mark). Though
the loan is in Annie and Tony’s name, Mark continues to make the payments to Evergreen on the
$417,000 loan. Tr. 250:19-25 (Mark).
III.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Whether the trial court properly found the Note and Deed of Trust were ambiguous and
parol evidence was thus admissible to determine the parties’ intent?
2. Whether the trial court properly found that the parties’ intent was for Mark’s and
Jennifer’s obligation under the Note and Deed of Trust to terminate once the Woodinville
home sold and the Legacy Loan was paid in full?
3. Whether Mark is entitled to attorneys fees?
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

Standard of Review
When reviewing a trial court’s interpretation of a Note or Deed of Trust, “the standard of

review ‘depends on whether the instrument is ambiguous.’” See Ida-Therm, LLC v. Bedrock
Geothermal, LLC, 154 Idaho 6, 8, 293 P.3d 630, 632 (2012) (quoting C&G, Inc. v. Rule, 135
Idaho 763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001)). This Court exercises free review over the question of law
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as to whether the document is ambiguous. See id. If the document is ambiguous, the Court “will
defer to the findings of the trial court so long as those findings are supported by substantial and
competent evidence.” See id. If the document is unambiguous, the Court will exercise free
review, construing the document “in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to the
meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument.” See C&G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho
763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001). Respondent asserts that the Note and Deed of Trust are
ambiguous—therefore, this Court should adhere to the trial court’s findings of fact which are
supported by substantial and competent evidence. See id.
B.
The trial court properly found that the Note and Deed of Trust are ambiguous and
parol evidence was admissible to determine the parties’ intent.
The trial court correctly found the Note and Deed of Trust on the Hayden home were
latently ambiguous, and thus parol evidence was admissible to ascertain the real intent of the
parties.
In interpreting the Note and Deed of Trust, “the primary purpose [of the Court] is ‘to seek
and give effect to the real intentions of the parties.” See Baker v. KAL, LLC, 163 Idaho 530, 534,
415 P.3d 939, 943 (2018) (quoting Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212, 218, 280 P.3d 715, 721
(2012)). If an ambiguity exists in the instrument, the Court may consider parol evidence in
interpreting the document to determine the intent of the drafter. See Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft &
Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259, 266, 297 P.3d 222, 229 (2012) (quoting In re Estate of Kirk, 127
Idaho 817, 824, 907 P.2d 724, 801 (1995)).
Courts must review the document as a whole to determine whether an ambiguity exists.
See Baker, 153 Idaho at 218, 380 P.3d at 721 (citing Hoch v. Vance, 155 Idaho 636, 639, 315
P.3d 824, 827 (2013)). “Uncertainties should be treated as ambiguities; such ambiguities are
subject to be cleared up by resort to the intention of the parties as gathered from the deed, from
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the circumstances leading up to its execution, from the subject matter, and from the situation of
the parties at the time. Id. (citing Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235,
1238 (2006)).
Generally, “there are two types of ambiguity, patent and latent.” Knipe Land Co. v.
Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 455, 259 P.3d 595, 601 (2011). Patent ambiguities are clear from the
face of the instrument, while latent ambiguities exist “where an instrument is clear on its face,
but loses that clarity when applied to the facts.” See id. (citing Cool v. Mountainview
Landowners Coop. Ass’n, 139 Idaho 770, 772-73, 86 P.3d 484, 486-87 (2004)). When the facts
reveal a latent ambiguity, the Court then must determine the intent of the parties. See id. (citing
Snoderly v. Bower, 30 Idaho 484, 488, 166 P. 265, 266 (1917)).
The trial court properly found that the Note and Deed of Trust on the Hayden home
“contain a latent ambiguity because the principal amount due under the Note is more than double
the amount Mark and Jennifer needed to purchase the subject property.” R. 472. Because there
was a significant difference between the purchase price on the Hayden home and the Note and
Deed of Trust, the Court needed to look to extrinsic evidence. The difference between the two
amounts indicates that the Note and Deed of Trust do not reflect the entire agreement of the
parties.
Additionally, the trial court found “the Note is a negotiable instrument under Idaho Code
§ 28-3-104(1) and is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.” R. 472. The UCC provides
that the Court may utilize other agreements when interpreting such an instrument. I.C. § 28-3117 (commenting that the agreement may provide additional conditions imposed on the
instrument).
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Appellants argue the trial court erred in finding there was a latent ambiguity in the Note
and Deed of Trust because the trial court “pointed to no term that was uncertain or that was
reasonably susceptible to differing interpretations.” App. Brief at 29. This argument misstates the
definition of “latent ambiguity.” A latent ambiguity is “not evidenced on the face of the
instrument alone, but becomes apparent when applying the instrument to the facts as they exist.”
See Swanson v. Beco Construction Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.3d 748, 751 (2007) (citing
In re Estate of Kirk, 127 Idaho 817, 824, 907 P.2d 764, 801 (1995)). Appellants cite Snoderly v.
Bower, a 1917 case, for the proposition that a latent ambiguity still requires a contract with “a
term that has different but reasonable meanings.” App. Brief, at 27 (citing Snoderly v. Bower, 30
Idaho 474, 166 P. 275 (1917)). However, neither Snoderly nor subsequent cases have required a
particular “term” with multiple reasonable meanings before finding a latent ambiguity. In fact,
Snoderly provides that the court may introduce extrinsic evidence both “to show that the latent
ambiguity actually existed” and the meaning of the ambiguity. See Snoderly, 30 Idaho 474, 166
P. 275, 265 (1917). While some instruments with latent ambiguities do involve a particular term
with multiple meanings, this is not a hard-and-fast rule. The trial court here determined that there
was a latent ambiguity because the principal amount in the Note and Deed of Trust were subject
to conflicting interpretations. R. 472.
The trial court was permitted to look at extrinsic evidence—including facts surrounding
the Hayden home purchase—to “show that the latent ambiguity actually existed.” R. 472; see
Snoderly, 30 Idaho 474, 166 P. 275, 265 (citing 2 Eng. Ruling Cases 718). Upon reviewing parol
evidence, the trial court found there were conflicting interpretations as to “why the principal
amount in the Note and Deed of Trust were more than double the amount needed to purchase the

BRIEF OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT: 12

Hayden home.” R. 473. These conflicting interpretations warranted an inquiry into the parties’
intent.
Appellants also assert that a Note or Deed of Trust cannot be found ambiguous simply
because the trial court perceived them as unreasonable or unfair. App. Brief at 31 (citing Howard
v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 143, 106 P.3d 465, 469 (2005)). However, the trial court did not
consider the Note and Deed of Trust ambiguous based on some perceived unfairness. The trial
court found the instruments ambiguous because of the inconsistencies between the principal
amount and the purchase price for the Hayden home. R. 472. The inconsistencies in the Note and
Deed of Trust throws a “shadow of ambiguity” over the instruments, warranting “the
introduction of parol evidence as an aid to discovering the intention of the parties.” See Porter v.
Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 404-05, 195 P.3d 1212, 1217-18 (2008) (citing Gardner v. Fliegel, 92
Idaho 767, 771, 450 P.2d 990, 994 (1969)). Thus, it was appropriate for the trial court to consider
extrinsic evidence to interpret the Note and Deed of Trust.
C.
The trial court properly determined the parties’ intent was for Mark’s and Jennifer’s
obligation under the Note and Deed of Trust to terminate once the Woodinville home sold and
the Legacy loan was paid in full.
The trial court’s interpretation of the parties’ intent under the Note and Deed of Trust is
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Because the Note and Deed of Trust are
ambiguous, the trial court must ascertain the “intention of the parties as reflected by all of the
circumstances in existence at the time the easement was given.” See Latham v. Garner, 105
Idaho 854, 858, 673 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1983) (citing Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 250, 270 P.2d
825, 829-30 (1954)). The trial court correctly found that parol evidence supported Mark and
Jennifer’s explanation for why the principal amount in the Note and Deed of Trust were more
than double the amount needed to purchase the Hayden home. R. 473.
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The Note and Deed of Trust were drafted to mirror the Legacy loan. Tr. 974:22-25 (Kim).
Jennifer and Mark signed the Note and Deed of Trust with the understanding that they would
own the Hayden home “free and clear” once the Woodinville home sold and the Legacy loan was
paid in full—this understanding was based on representations by Annie and Tony’s attorney, Joe
Mijich. Tr. 252:19-253:5; 170:12-13; 171:17-174:23; 258:1-6 (Mark). After Mark and Jennifer
left Pioneer Title Company, where Jennifer refused to sign the Note and Deed of Trust, Mark
called Joe Mijich. Tr. 169: 20-170:13. This phone call is corroborated by Mark’s cell phone
records. Mark and Jennifer testified Joe Mijich represented that they would own the Hayden
home “free and clear” upon the sale of the Woodinville home. Tr. 252:19-253:5; 96:25-97:7
(Mark); Tr. 737:7-14. The trial court found Mark and Jennifer were justified relying upon Joe
Mijich’s representation because he was acting as Annie and Tony’s attorney. R. 474.
Appellants assert that the trial court’s interpretation of the Note and Deed of Trust
introduced new conditions and effectively rewrote the parties’ contract. App. Brief at 32. The
trial court merely examined extrinsic evidence from all parties to determine the parties’
intentions in drafting the Note and Deed of Trust. After evaluating extrinsic evidence, the trial
court found Appellants’ “contention—that Mark and Jennifer owe $851,784 on the Note and
Deed of Trust— did not make sense.” R. 474. A future advancement clause will only be enforced
if the parties intended the mortgage to cover future advancements. See Biersdorff v. Brumfield,
93 Idaho 569, 572, 468 P.2d 301, 304 (1970). Distinguishing Biersdorff, the trial court found
there was “no credible evidence that the parties agreed that the Hayden home would be used to
secure subsequent refinances.” R. 475. Instead, parol evidence supports Mark and Jennifer’s
explanation that the “parties intended that Mark and Jennifer’s obligation under the Note and
Deed of Trust would be satisfied when the Legacy loan was paid in full.” R. 477. Because the
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Legacy loan was paid in full, Mark and Jennifer’s obligation was extinguished—therefore, they
did not default on the obligation. R. 477. The trial court’s interpretation of the Note and Deed of
Trust is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
D.
Tony and Annie Porcello were paid in full when the Legacy loan was paid off with the
second Evergreen loan.
Tony and Annie were made whole when the Legacy loan was paid off—and therefore,
they have no claim against Mark. The Woodinville house sold for $690,000 in July 2015. Tr.
212:17-18 (Mark). After all of the costs were taken into account, Mark and Annie suffered a net
loss. Tr. 213:10-16 (Mark). At trial, Mark explained that he and Annie would have to come up
with approximately $40,000 at closing if the Evergreen loan had not paid off the Legacy loan.
Tr. 210:18-23 (Mark). This is confirmed by the payoff.
The $417,000 Evergreen loan covered the loss on the Woodinville house for Mark,
Annie, and Tony. It also refinanced the $312,000 borrowed for the Hayden home. Though that
loan is in Annie and Tony’s name, it is undisputed that Mark makes all the payments on that
loan. Tr. 250:19-25 (Mark); Tr. 893:15-23 (Tony). Tony and Annie were made whole. This was
the reason Tony signed over the $157,157.40 check from the Woodinville sale to Mark. Tr.
209:7-210:3. Tony knew that Mark refinanced the entire debt and assumed the responsibility to
make sure it was paid.
If Tony believed he was owed more money, he could have had a lien recorded against the
Bellevue house—he elected not to because he knew he was paid in full when the second
Evergreen loan was taken out. Tony and Annie have no claim for an actual outstanding debt
because the Legacy loan was already fully satisfied.
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E.
Third Party Defendant-Respondent Mark Porcello is entitled to an award of attorney
fees pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).
Mark is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 12-120(3). Under the statute, a prevailing party is allowed reasonable attorney's fees and costs
in "any civil action to recover on ... [a] note." I.C. § 12-120(3). Mark is entitled to attorney fees
for "successfully defending an action an action to recover on a note." See Bream v. Benscoter,
139 Idaho 364, 369, 79 P.3d 723, 728 (2003).

V.

CONCLUSION

The Legacy loan was paid in full when the Evergreen loan was disbursed on July 21,
2015, and the proceeds from the sale of the Woodinville home were disbursed on July 30, 2015.
Upon payment in full on the Legacy loan, Mark and Jennifer's obligations under the Note were
satisfied. This Court should uphold the judgment of the district court for the reasons set forth
above.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of October, 2019.
SMITH + MALEK
By:

Isl Peter J. Smith IV
Peter J. Smith IV
Attorney for Third Party DefendantRespondent Mark Porcello
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